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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing is emerging as a revolutionary computing 
paradigm, while security and privacy become major concerns in 
the cloud scenario. For which Searchable Encryption (SE) 
technology is proposed to support efficient retrieval of encrypted 
data. However, the absence of lightweight ranked search with 
higher search quality in a harsh adversary model is still a typical 
shortage in existing SE schemes. In this paper, we propose a novel 
SE scheme called LRSE which firstly integrates machine learning 
methods into the framework of SE and combines local and global 
representations of encrypted cloud data to achieve the above 
design goals. In LRSE, we employ an improved secure kNN 
scheme to guarantee sufficient privacy protection. Our detailed 
security analysis shows that LRSE satisfies our formulated 
privacy requirements. Extensive experiments performed on 
benchmark datasets demonstrate that LRSE indeed achieves state-
of-the-art search quality with lowest system cost. 
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Information systems → Document filtering; • Security and 
privacy → Privacy-preserving protocols; • Management and 
querying of encrypted data; • Computing methodologies → 
Learning to rank; Neural networks; •Computer systems 
organization → Cloud computing 
KEYWORDS 
Searchable encryption, Lightweight, Higher search quality, 
Machine learning 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is a revolutionary computing paradigm which 
provides a flexible and economic strategy for data management 
and resource sharing [1], [2], thus is getting more and more 
attention from both academic and industry communities. However, 
security and privacy become major concerns in the cloud scenario 
when data owners outsource their private data onto public cloud 
servers to be accessed by the authenticated users. Usually, the 
cloud server is considered as curious and untrusted entities [3], 
thus there are risks of data exposure to a third party or even the 
cloud service provider itself. Therefore, providing sufficient 
security and privacy protections on sensitive data is extremely 
important, especially for those applications involved with health 
records, financial, government data, patents, managing passwords, 
private photos, etc. To avoid information leakage, the sensitive 
data should be encrypted before uploading onto the cloud servers, 
which makes it a big challenge to support efficient keyword based 
queries and rank the matching results on the encrypted data. 
To address the issue, searchable encryption (SE) technology 
has been proposed in the literature in pursuit of search over 
encrypted data. For schemes [3,5] that realize flexible search, they 
only support Boolean keyword search or single keyword search 
and return inaccurate results that are often loosely related to the 
user’s intent. In 2014, Cao et al. [6] firstly proposed an effective 
mechanism called MRSE to partially solve the multi-keyword 
ranked search problem according to the number of matching 
keywords between the query and documents, which established 
the foundation and basic framework of multi-keyword ranked 
search in the field of searchable encryption. As far as we know, 
most of latest schemes in SE follow this framework, such as [7, 8, 
9, 11, 14, 15]. As a consequence, they have the same congenital 
drawbacks. Here we conclude the congenital drawbacks of 
existing searchable encryption schemes as follows: 
1)  Low search quality. Most of latest existing SE schemes 
which follow the classic MRSE framework [6] are based on 
keyword match method, which is functionally inferior in the view 
of current plaintext information retrieval and machine learning. 
For example, MRSE simply counts the number of matching 
keywords between query and documents and does not take the 
access frequencies of the keywords into account. Although 
following work such as [8, 9, 11, 14, 15] employs TF×IDF 
weighting to substitute occurrence bits in binary vectors, they are 
still too primal and basic schemes, because TF×IDF weighting is 
quite a rudimentary technique in information retrieval field. 
2)  Dimension disaster. In MRSE [6], the system overhead 
during the whole process of index construction, trapdoor 
generation, and executing the query, is mostly determined by 
matrix multiplication, in another word, the large dimension of the 
sparse vector according to the dictionary in this framework causes 
dimension disaster. This problem leads to a result that searchable 
encryption schemes cannot be practically put to use in a real-
world scenario.   
3)  Lack of fuzzy search and intelligent search. For example, if 
data user inputs “producing” in the query, if the corresponding 
keyword in the dictionary is “produce”, it is quite difficult for 
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most existing SE schemes to return relevant results due to the lack 
of “producing” in the dictionary and keyword match based 
method. Let alone some more advanced examples in existing 
plaintext information retrieval, such as intelligent search using the 
semantic similarity, for example, “java” and “python”, or “iPhone” 
and “cellphone”. Because keyword match based method cannot 
measure semantic similarities in such cases. 
On the other hand, in the branch of plaintext information 
retrieval (IR) and document filtering, such as a common practice 
in web search engines (e.g., Google search), data users tend to 
provide a query containing several keywords as the indicator of 
their search interest to retrieve the most relevant data. “Coordinate 
matching”, i.e., as many matches as possible, and ranking 
matching documents by certain criteria has been widely used in 
the plaintext information retrieval (IR) field. In the field of 
document retrieval and natural language processing, machine 
learning based methods, such as word embeddings [4], are 
emerging as replacing traditional term vectors for measuring 
relatedness between terms. However, existing techniques in 
plaintext information retrieval and document filtering, such as [10] 
and [18], cannot be directly used in encrypted cloud scenario 
mentioned above for the reasons as follows: it is not practical for 
data owner to train word embeddings using CNN [24] or 
word2vec [4] for his local dataset each time, because the training 
process would greatly add to the time of building index. Besides, 
considering the local dataset of data owner may be small, it is not 
realistic to train a local model on a small dataset. In addition, in 
the framework of SE, the data owner and data user are separate 
entities, thus it’s difficult for the data user to embed the query 
keywords into the same space of word embeddings as the data 
owner. In conclusion, how to choose and apply appropriate 
machine learning methods to the framework of SE remains a 
challenging task. To the best of our knowledge, in literature, there 
are no existing SE schemes based on machine learning methods 
and aiming to achieve the goal of higher search quality, 
lightweight search with low system cost and supporting fuzzy and 
intelligent search in a harsh adversary model. Our motivation and 
focus in this paper are achieving the above goals. In this paper, we 
propose a novel lightweight efficient multi-keyword ranked 
search over encrypted cloud data (LRSE) scheme that supports 
top-k retrieval in a harsh adversary model. In summary, this paper 
makes the following contributions: 
1) For the first time, it successfully introduces machine learning 
methods into SE framework. Our original idea is: we design the 
whole protocol to combine local and global representations of 
documents to guarantee the search quality. 
2)  It beats existing SE schemes on a benchmark dataset and 
achieves state-of-the-art search quality. Besides, it can also 
support fuzzy and intelligent search. 
3) Experiments on a real-world dataset further show the 
proposed scheme introduces much lower overhead than existing 
SE schemes. 
4) Thorough analysis investigating privacy issues in a harsh 
adversary model is given. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we discuss 
existing related work on searchable encryption and plaintext 
document filtering based on machine learning methods in Section 
2. In Section 3, we introduce the system model, adversary model, 
and security requirements. Section 4 describes the LRSE 
framework and proposed schemes, followed by Section 5, which 
focuses on security analysis. Section 6 presents search quality 
evaluation and system cost simulation results. At last, we 
conclude the paper in Section 7. 
2  Related Work 
2.1  Existing Searchable Encryption 
Cao et al. [6] firstly propose an effective mechanism which can 
partially solve the multi-keyword ranked query problem according 
to the number of matching keywords in a vector space model 
(VSM), however, MRSE does not take the access frequencies of 
the keywords into account. It only returns the documents ordered 
by the number of matched keywords. Besides, MRSE has 
problems such as low search quality and dimension disaster. Yu et 
al. [11] propose a two-round searchable encryption that supports 
top-k multi-keyword retrieval (TRSE) scheme, which can 
guarantee high security and practical search accuracy. Its main 
idea is combining VSM model and homomorphic encryption. The 
VSM model helps to provide search accuracy and homomorphic 
encryption guarantees high security. However, it is still based on 
keyword match method and has the problems of dimension 
disaster, low search quality and lack of intelligent search. Besides, 
homomorphic encryption usually leads to much larger system 
overhead. Zhao et al. [9] firstly propose a privacy-preserving 
personalized search (PPSE) scheme which supports personalized 
search in SE. The main idea is to combine TF×IDF weighting 
VSM model and preference weight formally generated in local 
user interest model by the data user. However, dimension disaster 
leads to huge system cost because of employing VSM model.  
In 2016, Xia et al. [14] propose a secure and dynamic multi-
keyword ranked search scheme over encrypted cloud data. The 
goal is supporting dynamic update operations on documents and 
sub-linear search time. The main idea is combining secure kNN 
encryption with TF×IDF weighting VSM model, constructing a 
special tree-based index structure and relying on a greedy depth-
first search to achieve sub-linear search time. However, it’s still 
based on TF×IDF keyword match method and suffers from low 
search quality and lack of fuzzy and intelligent search. Besides, 
time cost for index tree construction is huge, although its index 
building part costs sub-linear search time, the system cost is still 
not lightweight enough compared with our dimension reduction 
based scheme. In 2016, Li et al. [15] propose a scheme enabling 
fine-grained multi-keyword search supporting classified sub-
dictionaries over encrypted cloud data. The goal is supporting 
complicated logic search operations of keywords, and reducing 
system cost. The main idea is combining secure kNN encryption 
and VSM model, introducing the TF×IDF relevance score and 
preference weight to improve search quality and realizing the 
“AND”, “OR”, “NO” operations in the multi-keyword search. 
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Besides, it employs the classified sub-dictionaries technique to 
reduce the system cost. However, it is still based on TF×IDF 
weighting keyword match based method. Besides, system cost is 
still much larger than our lightweight scheme realized by 
dimension reduction.  
As to latest SE schemes in 2017, [16] focuses on proposing 
multi-level access control policy using broadcast encryption, 
which means different users should have different access rights, 
and only be permitted to search over data that they are authorized. 
[17] focuses on multi-user searchable encryption (MSE), which 
achieves fine-grained access control to grant and revoke the 
privileges of users without a trusted third party (TTP), and the key 
distribution is integrated with user authorization and search 
procedures. However, [16, 17] focus more on security protocols 
design and support novel functions such as multi-level access 
control and multi-user SE schemes, their search quality and 
system cost part have no improvement. While our main focus is 
improving search quality and achieving lightweight search. 
2.2  Plaintext Document Filtering based on 
machine Learning 
In 2016, Nalisnick et al. [10] propose a dual embedding space 
model (DESM), which uses dual word embeddings, one for 
generating query vector, and the other one for generating 
document vector. DESM can be used to calculate the similarity 
between a document and a query term, complementing the 
traditional term frequency based approach. In 2017, Mitra et al. 
[18] propose a duet model that jointly learns two deep neural 
networks using local and distributed representations of text, 
respectively. They train word embeddings on the local dataset and 
the training dataset using CNN, respectively, and add the two 
scores at the final step. Thus, it performs better than all the 
existing schemes that merely use traditional baselines or neural 
baselines, and achieves state-of-the-art search quality in the field 
of plaintext document ranking. However, [10] and [18] are not 
directly applicable in the context of encrypted cloud data retrieval. 
The reasons have been elaborated in the introduction part. 
3  Problem Formulation 
3.1  System Model 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, our scheme involves three different 
entities. 
 
Figure 1: System Model. 
1)  The cloud server: the cloud server is an intermediate entity 
hosting third-party data storage and retrieval services to 
authenticated data users. When received a trapdoor from the data 
user, the cloud server will locate the matching documents by 
scanning the indexes I, calculate corresponding relevance scores, 
and return the ranked top-k results to the data user. 
2)  The data owner: the data owner encrypts a collection of 
documents D using symmetric key encryption algorithm and 
builds a searchable index I according to the building index process, 
then he outsources both the encrypted indexes I and encrypted 
files C onto the cloud server. After that, the data owner sends SK 
to the data user, and the details of SK is stated in section 4.1. 
3)  The data user: the data user generates a trapdoor with SK 
and sends it to the cloud server. Afterward, the data user is 
returned the most relevant top-k encrypted documents by the 
cloud server, then he decrypts and makes use of them with the 
help of SK. 
Note here, there is a special case where the data owner is the 
same as the data user, that’s to say, the data owner keeps his 
secret key K by himself and only searches over his own encrypted 
documents. Then there are only two entities left in this special 
case: the data owner and the cloud server. This case also has many 
vivid applications in daily life, for example, when we upload our 
local documents in the phone and PC to the cloud server, such as 
Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and Baidu cloud drive, there is a 
horrible security problem: some documents related to passwords, 
patents to be published, private photos, health records, etc. are 
exposed to the mentioned companies. This special case could help 
solve the mentioned problem. 
3.2  Adversary Model and Security 
Requirements 
The cloud server is considered as honest but curious, i.e., it is 
designed to execute the service algorithm faithfully, however, it is 
also curious and eager to attain sensitive information. In this paper, 
we define all the security requirements in a harsh adversary model, 
which means level 3 attack model in [13]. Let H means the 
knowledge that cloud server knows. In level 3 attack model, cloud 
server observes a set of plain document vectors 𝑃 𝑖𝑛 𝐷, and knows 
the corresponding encrypted index, i.e., 𝐻 =< 𝐸(𝐷), 𝑃, 𝐼 >
,  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃 ⊂ 𝐷,  𝐼(𝑡) = 𝐸𝑇(𝑡,  𝑆𝐾) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ∈ 𝑃. As described in 
[13], if an encryption scheme resists a higher-level attack, it 
resists a lower level one as well. Thus, in this paper we only prove 
our schemes could resist level 3 attack. Security requirements are 
defined as follows: 
1)  Data, index, and trapdoor privacy: data privacy means that 
LRSE should prevent the cloud server from poking its nose into 
the outsourced data. Index privacy means that the index should be 
constructed to prevent the cloud server from performing 
association attack i.e., deducing any association between 
keywords and encrypted documents. Besides, trapdoor privacy 
means the keywords the user submits according to his interest is 
well protected by the complexity of trapdoor generating algorithm. 
2)  Unlinkability of trapdoors: as described in [6], in level 3 
adversary model, the cloud server is more powerful and possesses 
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some statistical information to carry out Scale Analysis Attack [6]. 
The linkability of trapdoor may cause leakage of privacy. For 
example, the cloud server may determine two trapdoors are 
originated from the same keywords or whether the trapdoor 
contains some certain keywords. We should assure that the cloud 
server would not be able to identify the keywords in a query even 
if some background information had been leaked. 
4  The Design of LRSE 
In this section, we firstly propose a basic idea for the LRSE by 
elegantly combining machine learning methods with an improved 
kNN scheme, which mainly consists of the following four phases: 
Initialization, BuildIndex, GenTrapdoor, and Query. 
4.1  Initialization 
Data preprocessing. The data owner executes data 
prepossessing process on his documents, including stop words, 
punctuations filtering, lowercase, tokenize, and lemmatize using 
the famous NLTK toolkits1. Afterward, the data owner extracts 
top-10 keywords for each document 𝐷𝑖  in dataset D using 
TF×IDF weighting method as Equ.(1): 
𝑤(𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝑖) =
𝑡𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑗,𝐷𝑖)∙𝑖𝑑𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑗) 
√∑ [𝑡𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑗,𝐷𝑖)∙𝑖𝑑𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑗)]
2
𝑡𝑖𝑗∈𝐷𝑖
     (1) 
Where, 𝑖𝑑𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑗) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
|𝐷|
|𝐷𝑡𝑖𝑗|
+ 0.01)               (2) 
In this equation, 𝑡𝑓(𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝑖) is the term frequency of keyword 
𝑡𝑖𝑗  in document 𝐷𝑖 . Then the data owner generates keyword-
document matrix A using vector space model (VSM), where each 
item in matrix 𝐴 is the the TF×IDF weight value 𝑤(𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝑖) of 
keyword 𝑡𝑖𝑗. 
Afterward, the data owner executes the reduce dimension 
representation by Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [19, 20] 
as follows: for a keyword-document matrix 𝐴 with 𝑡 rows and |𝐷| 
columns, SVD finds the approximation matrix called 𝐴𝑛1 as:  
             𝐴𝑛1 = 𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1𝑉𝑛1
𝑇          (3) 
Usually we take 𝑛1 ∈ [200, 500]. In Equ.(3), 𝑡  is the original 
keyword number in the dataset 𝐷, 𝑛1 is the concept number after 
dimension reduction by 𝑆𝑉𝐷 , 𝑈𝑛1  is the 𝑡×𝑛1  keyword-concept 
matrix, 𝑆𝑛1 is the 𝑛1×𝑛1  concept matrix, and 𝑉𝑛1
𝑇  is the 𝑛1×|𝐷| 
concept-document matrix. 
Generate external word embeddings. Word embeddings [4] 
are a generic name of a set of NLP techniques, where each unique 
word is represented by a relatively low dimension vector of real 
numbers. Their models are learned through two-layer neural 
networks to capture linguistic contexts of words. We trained word 
embeddings using word2vec [4] in this paper. Word2vec helps to 
                                                                
1   http://www.nltk.org/ 
represent each word w of the training set as a vector of features, 
where this vector is supposed to capture the contexts in which w 
appears. 
In this paper, we choose the whole 2015 English Wikipedia 
corpus2, containing 2,126,359 words, as the training set to train an 
external word embeddings for our LRSE framework. We denote 
the pre-trained word embeddings using the notation 𝑊𝑒 . The 
training parameters of word2vec are set as follows: continuous 
bag of words (CBOW) model instead of the skip-gram (word2vec 
options: cbow = 1); the output vectors size is usually set as 𝑛2 ∈
[50, 300] , and we choose 100 for 𝑛2  in this paper (word2vec 
options:size = 100); the number of negative samples is set to 5 
(word2vec options: negative = 5). 
Generate key. The data owner randomly generates an (n+1)-
dimension binary vector as S and two (n+1)×(n+1) invertible 
matrices {M1, M2}, where 𝑛 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 ∈[250, 800], and 𝑛1 is the 
the concept number after dimension reduction by 𝑆𝑉𝐷 , usually 
𝑛1 ∈[200, 500]; 𝑛2 is dimension of word vectors mapping from 
the pre-trained word embeddings, usually 𝑛2 ∈ [50, 300]. The 
secret key 𝐾 is in the form of a 3-tuple as {𝑆,  𝑀1,  𝑀2}. Then the 
data owner sends SK = (𝐾,  𝑠𝑘,  𝑈𝑛1 , 𝑆𝑛1 , 𝑉 , 𝑊𝑒 ) to data users 
through a secure channel. 𝑠𝑘 is the symmetric key (e.g. AES [14]) 
used to encrypt documents outsourced to cloud server; 
𝑈𝑛1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑛1  are generated in SVD dimension reduction; 𝑉 is the 
dataset vocabulary of the data owner; 𝑊𝑒 is the pre-trained word 
embeddings. We extend the dimension of vectors and matrices in 
our schemes to (n+1)-dimension because of the improved secure 
kNN scheme. 
Note that S is part of secret key K, which is exactly a binary 
vector, acting as an indicating vector in the spilt process of 
building index and generating trapdoor. S is randomly generated 
by the data owner using existing Random Number Generation 
Algorithm (PRGA) in the field of information security, which is 
not within the scope of this paper. 
4.2  BuildIndex 
Generate initial document vector. For each document 𝐷𝑖, the 
data owner generates 𝑑1 = 𝑑
𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1 , then calculates its 
standard unit vector: 𝑑1⃗⃗⃗⃗ =
𝑑1
‖𝑑1‖
, where 𝑑  is the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ  column 
vector in matrix 𝐴, denoting the TF×IDF weighting document 
vector for document 𝐷𝑖. Then the data owner maps the extracted 
keywords for each document in word embeddings: let 
𝑑2 =  ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗  ∙  𝑡𝑖𝑗∈𝐷𝑖 𝑤(𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝑖), where 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is the embedding vector 
for the j-th keyword of document 𝐷𝑖; 𝑤(𝑡𝑖𝑗 , 𝐷𝑖) is the normalized 
TF×IDF weight of keyword 𝑡𝑖𝑗  in document 𝐷𝑖 in Equ.(1); then 
calculate its standard unit vector: 𝑑2⃗⃗⃗⃗ =
𝑑2
‖𝑑2‖
. Afterward, the data 
owner generates the initial document vector for document 𝐷𝑖: 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ 
= (𝑑1⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑑2⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 1), which is an (n + 1) dimensional vector, and 𝑛 = 
𝑛1 + 𝑛2. 
                                                                
2   https://dumps.wikimedia.org/enwiki/latest/enwiki-latest-pages-articles.xml.bz2 
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Splitting process. The data owner executes the splitting 
process using the secret key 𝐾 = {𝑆,  𝑀1,  𝑀2}, For m=1 to n+1, if 
𝑆 [𝑚] = 1 , then 𝐷?̇?′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]  and 𝐷?̇?′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  [𝑚] are set to two random 
numbers so that their sum is equal to 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]; else, 𝐷?̇?′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]  and 
𝐷?̇?′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  [𝑚] are set as the same as 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]. Every plaintext subindex 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ 
is then spilt into a document vector pair donated as {𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  }. 
Finally, the subindex 𝐼𝑖 = {𝑀1
𝑇𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗,𝑀2
𝑇𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  } is built for every 
encrypted document Ci. Let 𝐼 denote the set of subindex 𝐼𝑖, we call 
𝐼  index in our scheme. Finally the data owner encrypts his 
documents using symmetric key 𝑠𝑘, and outsources the encrypted 
documents C together with index 𝐼 to the cloud server. 
4.3  GenTrapdoor 
Generate initial query vector. The data user inputs a set of query 
keywords according to his interest. Let q denote the query 
vector according to the received vocabulary V. The data user 
generates 𝑞1= 𝑞
𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1. Then calculate its standard unit 
vector: 𝑞1⃗⃗  ⃗ =
𝑞1
‖𝑞1‖
. Afterward, the data user maps the query 
keywords in word embeddings. Let 𝑞2 =  ∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑞𝑘∈𝑄 , where 𝑞𝑘 
is the embedding vector for the k-th keyword in the query; 
then calculate its standard unit vector: 𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗ =
𝑞2
‖𝑞2‖
. Afterward, 
the data user generates an initial vector ?⃗?  for query Q using ?⃗?  
= (𝑞1⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗ ). ?⃗?  is extended to (𝑟?⃗? , 𝑡), which is (n+1)-dimension, 
𝑟 and t are random numbers, and 𝑟 > 0. Note here only the data 
user knows the exact values of r and t. 
Splitting process. The splitting process in generating trapdoor 
is on the contrary to the splitting process in building index. For 
m=1 to (n+1), if 𝑆 [𝑚] = 0 , 𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ [𝑚]  and 𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚]  are set to two 
random numbers so that their sum is equal to ?⃗? [𝑚]; else, 𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ [𝑚] 
and 𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚] are set the same as ?⃗? [𝑚]. Finally, the trapdoor T is 
generated as {𝑀1
−1𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑀2
−1𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗} for the query. Finally the data 
user sends the trapdoor T to the cloud server, with which the cloud 
server could execute the query process. 
4.4  Query 
For each subindex 𝐼𝑖 , with the trapdoor T, the cloud server 
computes the relevance scores as shown in the following equation, 
ranks all relevance scores and returns the top-k ranked encrypted 
documents to the data user. 
 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝐼𝑖 , 𝑇) =  𝐼𝑖 ⋅ 𝑇 = {𝑀1
𝑇𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗, 𝑀2
𝑇𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  } ∙ {𝑀1
−1𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑀2
−1𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗}      
                      = 𝐷𝑖′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ ∙  𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗  + 𝐷𝑖′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ∙  𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ 
       =  (𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗, 1) ∙  (𝑟?⃗? , 𝑡)  
   = (d1⃗⃗⃗⃗ , d2⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 1) ∙ (rq1⃗⃗⃗⃗ , rq2⃗⃗⃗⃗ ,  t) 
                        = 𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒1(d1⃗⃗⃗⃗ ,  q1⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) + 𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒2(d2⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) + 𝑡    (4)                  
where,                 
             𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒1(d1⃗⃗⃗⃗ ,  q1⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) = 
𝑑𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1 ∙  𝑞𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1
‖𝑑𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1‖∙‖𝑞𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1‖
 
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒2(d2⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) =
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑡𝑖𝑗∈𝐷𝑖 𝑤(𝑡𝑖𝑗,𝐷𝑖)∙
∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑞𝑘∈𝑄
‖∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ∙ 𝑡𝑖𝑗∈𝐷𝑖 𝑤(𝑡𝑖𝑗,𝐷𝑖)‖∙‖
∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑞𝑘∈𝑄 ‖
                   
5  Security Analysis 
In this section, we analyze the security properties in a level 3 
adversary model as illustrated in section 3.2. We will focus on 
three aspects: data privacy, index and trapdoor privacy, and 
trapdoor unlinkability. 
5.1  Data Privacy 
Traditional symmetric key encryption techniques (e.g., AES 
[12]) could be properly utilized here to guarantee data privacy and 
is not within the scope of this paper. 
5.2  Index and Trapdoor Privacy 
We refer to the original secure kNN scheme [13] and give 
THEOREM 1 as follows: 
THEOREM 1. LRSE is resilient to a level-3 attack if the bit 
string S in secret key K is kept confidential. 
Analysis. The proof process is based on the same principle as 
THEOREM 6 in the original secure kNN scheme [13]. Thus we do 
not prove it again in our paper. The only differences exist in our 
added artificial attributes: in the process of building index of [13], 
the (𝑛 + 1)-dimension is set to −0.5‖𝑝‖2 , while the  (𝑛 + 1)-
dimension is set to 1 as described in section 4.3 in our scheme; in 
the process of generating trapdoor, the first 𝑛  dimensions are 
given by 𝑟?⃗? , and the (𝑛 + 1)-dimension is also set to 𝑟, while in 
our scheme we set the (𝑛 + 1)-dimension as a random number 𝑡. 
Thus our vector dimension and encryption procedure including 
the splitting process are the same as the original secure kNN 
scheme. Actually the core idea in [13] is: if the cloud server does 
not know the splitting configuration, i.e. the bit string S, the 
equations he models for solving the key K is 𝑀1
𝑇𝑝′̂ =  𝑝′, where 
the cloud server only knows the details of 𝑝′, while he does not 
know 𝑀1
𝑇and 𝑝′̂, therefore he cannot decrypt the transformation 
matrix 𝑀1
𝑇 in the key K due to lack of sufficient information. 
Thus the proof has nothing to do with the added artificial 
attributes, and only determined by the splitting process. Therefore 
the original proof process in [13] can be applied to our case. In 
another word, if the cloud server cannot derive the splitting 
configuration, i.e. the bit string S in the key K in LRSE scheme, 
the index and trapdoor privacy can be achieved.  
Another issue is what the value of 𝑛′  would be sufficiently 
large. As stated in [13], the general consensus is that 1024-bit RSA 
[22] keys are roughly equivalent in strength to that of 80-bit 
symmetric keys. As 𝑛′ ∈ (251,  801)  in our scheme, which is 
much larger than 80, so that the search space is sufficiently large. 
When 𝑛′ increases, the search space enlarges exponentially. 
Besides, in the initial document vector and query vector, 𝑑2⃗⃗⃗⃗  and 
𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗  are generated by computations on word embeddings, which 
may pose a new security challenge. Because attackers may know 
word embeddings trained on popular corpus such as Wikipedia 
and news streams. In fact, this attack example conforms to the 
 . 
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level 2 adversary model in [13]: cloud server knows a set of plain 
document vectors 𝑃 ; but does not know the corresponding 
encrypted index in 𝐸(𝐷), i.e., 𝐻 =  < 𝐸(𝐷), 𝑃 > 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑃 ⊂ 𝐷. 
As stated in [13], if an encryption scheme resists a higher level 
attack, it resists a lower level one as well. Thus our LRSE scheme 
can resist this kind of attack. 
5.3  Trapdoor Unlinkability 
The trapdoor should be constructed to prevent the cloud server 
from deducing the relationships of any given trapdoors and the 
corresponding keywords. 
Table 1. The structure of ?⃗?   
?⃗⃗? [1]⋯ ?⃗⃗? [n1] ?⃗⃗? [n1+1]⋯ ?⃗⃗? [n1+n2] ?⃗⃗? [n1+n2+1] 
𝑛1-dimension 𝑛2-dimension 1-dimension 
𝒓 ∙ 𝒒𝟏⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  𝒓 ∙ 𝒒𝟐⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  𝒕 
 
According to the procedure of generating trapdoor in section 
4.3, the details of ?⃗?  is illustrated as Tab.1, where 𝑟 and  t  are 
random numbers defined by data user, and 𝑟 > 0 . 𝑞1⃗⃗  ⃗ =
𝑞𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1
‖𝑞𝑇𝑈𝑛1𝑆𝑛1
−1‖
, and 𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗ =
∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑞𝑘∈𝑄
‖∑ 𝑞𝑘𝑞𝑘∈𝑄 ‖
. Finally, ?⃗?  is split to (𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗) 
according to the splitting indicator 𝑆  in the splitting process. 
Specifically, for 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 (𝑛 + 1): if 𝑆 [𝑚] = 0, then 𝑄′⃗⃗⃗⃗ [𝑚] and 
𝑄′′⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗[𝑚] are set to two random numbers so that their sum is equal 
to ?⃗? [𝑚]; assume in 𝑆 the number of 0 is 𝜇, and each dimension in 
?⃗?  is 𝛿𝑞 -bits. Random numbers 𝑟 and  t  are 𝛿𝑟 -bits and 𝛿𝑡 -bits 
respectively. Besides, assume there are 𝛼 sequences composed of 
the values of all dimensions in ?⃗? . Note that 𝜇, 𝛿𝑞 , 𝛿𝑟  and 𝛿𝑡  are 
independent of each other. Then in our LRSE scheme, we can 
compute the probability that two trapdoors are generated the same 
as follows: 
𝑃 =
1
𝛼∙2𝛿𝑟 ∙(2𝛿𝑞)𝜇∙2𝛿𝑡
=
1
𝛼∙2𝛿𝑟+𝛿𝑡+𝜇∙𝛿𝑞
               (5) 
Therefore, the larger values of 𝜇 , 𝛿𝑞 , 𝛿𝑟  and 𝛿𝑡 , the lower 
probability that two trapdoors are the same, for example, if we 
choose 1024-bit Random number 𝑟 , 𝛿𝑟 = 1024 , then 𝑃 <
1/21024 . As a result, the probability that two trapdoors are 
generated the same can be negligible.  
The above argument is just showing the size of possible space 
when generating trapdoors. However, the cloud may execute some 
attack based on his obtained background information and 
powerful computation ability. For example, there is a kind of 
Scale Analysis Attack introduced in [6]. Basically, in MRSE 
schemes, vectors in the original document and query vectors are 
sparse binary vectors. Thus in its query equation the values of ?⃗? ∙
?⃗?  equals to the number of matched keywords. Then the cloud 
server can deduce whether a trapdoor contains some certain 
keywords by constructing some equations as shown in [6]. 
However, our scheme can resist Scale Analysis Attack because the 
initial vectors in our schemes are low-dimensional vectors of real 
numbers and the values of 𝐷𝑖⃗⃗  ⃗ ∙ ?⃗?  = 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒1(d1⃗⃗⃗⃗ ,  q1⃗⃗⃗⃗ ) +
𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒2(d2⃗⃗⃗⃗ , 𝑞2⃗⃗⃗⃗ )  in the Equ. (4), which represent the relevance 
scores of document 𝐷𝑖  and query Q, disclose no relationship 
between the trapdoor and certain keywords. 
Discussion 1. Here we must admit that our scheme also cannot 
protect against Access Pattern [6] as most existing SE schemes 
such as [3][6][8][9][11][14][15][23], which is defined as the 
sequence of ranked search results. For example, the cloud server 
could conduct frequency analysis on the access pattern and 
deduce the linkability information of two trapdoors. Our proposed 
scheme is not designed to protect against Access Pattern, because 
of the efficiency consideration just as most existing SE schemes 
(excluding costly PIR technique [3]).  
6  Performance Evaluation 
6.1  Search quality experiments 
Experiment settings. Most existing SE schemes such as 
[6][9][15][23] conduct their search quality experiments on a real-
world dataset: the NSF research award dataset3 or Enron Email 
Dataset4 using the criteria of P@K. However, these datasets only 
give the keyword ID of each document, while there is no given 
queries and gold standard results for each query. Besides, the 
criteria of P@K ignores the ranking order of retrieval results and 
their relevance scores to the query. In our paper, we employ the 
Cranfield dataset5 as the benchmark dataset, which is a pioneering 
test collection in the field of information retrieval. The details of 
Cranfield are summarized as follows: the titles and articles are 
collected from aerodynamics journal articles in the UK; there are 
1,400 documents and 225 queries; in the file named “cranqrel”, 
for each query they have given the relevance assessments of each 
document, which range from 0 (irrelevant) to 4 (perfectly 
relevant). We have implemented some most recent SE schemes as 
our baselines. In this paper, we use the criteria of NDCG@3, 10, 
which considers the ranking orders and relevance scores of 
retrieval results, and is defined as follows: 
𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑘 = 𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑘 𝐼𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑘⁄                       (6) 
Where, 𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑘 = ∑
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑖+1)
𝑘
𝑖=1 , 𝐼𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑘 = ∑
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖
𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑖+1)
|𝑅𝐸𝐿|
𝑖=1  
|REL| represents the list of relevant documents (ordered by their 
relevance scores) in the returned results up to position k (i.e. 3 and 
10, respectively). 
Search quality results. Tab.2 reports NDCG based evaluation 
results on the benchmark dataset for our LRSE scheme and all the 
baseline schemes. 
                                                                
3   https://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/nsfabs/nsfawards.html 
4   https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~./enron/ 
5   http://ir.dcs.gla.ac.uk/resources/test_collections/cran/ 
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Table 2. NDCG results of existing SE schemes and our LRSE 
scheme 
SE schemes NDCG@3 NDCG@10 
MRSE_I (keyword-count based) [6] 0.434 0.483 
MRSE_II (keyword-count based) [6] 0.351 0.400 
TF×IDF-based [8][9][11][14][15] 0.655 0.666 
DESM-based(IN-IN) [10] 0.147 0.199 
DESM-based(IN-OUT) [10] 0.218 0.285 
SVD only (Our scheme) 0.633 0.651 
TF×IDF weighting Wiki embeddings 
only (Our Scheme) 
0.474 0.521 
LRSE (Our scheme) 0.672 0.673 
 
From Tab.2 we can observe that LRSE achieves state-of-the-art 
search quality and beats existing SE schemes on NDCG scores 
including TF×IDF-based schemes such as [8][9][11][14][15]. In 
the implement of LRSE, we choose the concept number after 
dimension reduction by 𝑆𝑉𝐷  as 𝑛1 = 300 , and the vector 
dimension in word embeddings as 𝑛2 =100. The MRSE schemes 
are based on simply counting the matched keywords number 
among the index and trapdoor, which is quite an original keyword 
match based method. Let alone MRSE_II scheme adds U dummy 
keywords to the final results, thus we can see MRSE_II lose to 
MRSE_I because of the inserted dummy keywords. Here we 
executed MRSE_II scheme using the following parameters as 
written in [6]: U = 200, 𝑉 =  100, 𝜎 = 0.5, 𝜇 = 0, 𝑐 = 0.87, thus 
each dummy keywords 𝜀(𝑗) follows the same uniform distribution 
𝑀(−0.87, 0.87) , where 𝑗 ∈ [1,100]. We also integrate DESM 
model [10] which uses external dual word embeddings6 trained by 
Microsoft on Bing queries into SE framework as one of our 
baselines. In our scheme, vector 𝑑2 employs TF×IDF weighting 
word vectors mapping from Wikipedia embeddings, which is 
different from the formulas representing documents and query 
vector in DESM paper. From Tab.2 we can see that DESM-based 
schemes performs much worse than our scheme using only 
TF×IDF weighting Wikipedia embeddings, because DESM relies 
on external word embeddings trained on Bing queries, not on the 
test dataset, while the cranfield dataset is relatively old, and only 
focuses on glossary in aerodynamics journal articles, which is 
quite different from Bing queries.  
In literature of the plaintext document filtering, SVD only is 
expected to perform better than TF×IDF, because the dimension 
reduction results as semantic space, and helps ignore some noise. 
However, in the cranfield dataset, explicit keyword match of 
aerodynamics glossary is dominant. Thus our SVD-based scheme 
slightly loses to TF×IDF because dimension reduction of SVD 
causes information loss, and its function of latent semantic 
relationship contribute little in this dataset. Therefore it calls for 
the help of external word embeddings in LRSE scheme. We can 
see that our complete LRSE scheme, the combination of SVD and 
                                                                
6   https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=52597 
TF×IDF weighting Wikipedia embeddings beats TF×IDF-based 
schemes [8, 9, 11, 14, 15], because TF×IDF weighting external 
word embeddings adds global semantic information and TF×IDF 
factor of local keywords in the final search results, which 
contributes to the search results. 
In addition, our scheme can also partly support fuzzy search and 
intelligent search due to the help of NLTK toolkits1 in the data 
preprocessing process. Besides, SVD concept space and word 
embeddings can help measure semantic relatedness between 
keywords, for example, if we search “Java.”, the top-k keywords 
are as follows: “Java”, “swing”, “android”, “c++”, “c#”, 
“python”, “eclipse”, etc. And if we input “android” as a query 
keyword, the top-k relevant keywords are “Android”, “iPhone”, 
“blackberry”, “emulator”, “java”, etc. 
Discussion 2. In this paper, what we provide is a general 
framework. For example, when choosing external word 
embeddings, the data owner can replace our provided Wikipedia 
word embeddings using the dual word embeddings6 if the 
documents in his dataset are relatively new and more relevant to 
Bing queries. If so, attackers can also obtain the external word 
embeddings, and the security issues have been discussed in 
section 5.2. 
Discussion 3. Our scheme is expected to perform even better 
than TF×IDF-based SE schemes on more common datasets that 
are not so old and made up of the dominant glossary. Because in 
that case, our SVD and external word embeddings would 
contribute more by measuring the latent semantic distance of 
keywords and introducing global information. In the future, we 
need do experiments on more datasets to prove the generality. 
Discussion 4. LRSE also lightens the problems caused by 
dictionary updates in most existing SE schemes: since the 
vocabulary size of our word embeddings is large enough, we 
almost do not need to change the vocabulary. Besides, LRSE can 
also reduce the system cost even when the vocabulary in our 
scheme has to be updated, through dimension reduction by 
utilizing SVD and word embeddings. 
Discussion 5. Actually our scheme can also support 
personalized search. In the process of generating trapdoor, we can 
refer to Refs. [8][15] to  make the data user assign a number as his 
preference weight, or refer to Ref. [9] to build a local user interest 
model to formally generate user preference weight. If so, when  
generate trapdoor in section 4.3, the keyword vector should firstly 
multiply its preference weight. Because we did not find a 
benchmark dataset containing gold standard for personalized 
search, we  did not discuss the details of personalized search in 
the evaluation part in this paper. 
6.2  System cost experiments 
We conduct a thorough experiment on a real-world dataset: the 
NSF research award dataset3 and evaluate the performance of 
LRSE compared with existing schemes [6, 9, 15, 23]. The details 
of benchmark dataset are summarized as follows: (a) 129,000 
abstracts describing NSF awards for basic research, (b) bag-of-
word data documents extracted from the abstracts, (c) a list of 
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keywords for indexing the bag-of-word data in the file named 
“1wk1wd”, from which we randomly select numbers of 
documents and conduct real-world system cost experiments on a 
computer using Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4590 CPU 3.30 GHz with 
16.0 GB RAM. The criteria is time cost (s) or space cost (KB). 
Note in the implement of LRSE scheme, we choose vector 
dimension n as 300 to 700 for the dictionary size of 2,000 to 
10,000, respectively. 
1) Building Index: as depicted in Fig.2(a) and Fig.2(b), the 
time cost of building index is determined by the number of 
documents and the computation complex of building each 
subindex, and LRSE achieves much more lightweight system cost 
than existing schemes. As depicted in section 4.2, the major 
computation of building a subindex includes four parts: search in 
word embeddings for each keyword of the document, generate the 
initial vector using mentioned equations, the splitting process and 
two multiplications of an (n + 1) × (n + 1) matrix and an (n + 1)-
dimension vector. As illustrated in Fig.2(a), given the same size 
of 1,000 documents with different vector dimensions, the index 
construction time of LRSE is much less than baseline schemes due 
to the difference of their vector dimensions. In the implement of 
FMSCS [15], we divide the total dictionary into 1 common sub-
dictionary and 3 professional sub-dictionaries to generate index as 
illustrated in [15]. Although time cost of FMSCS is much less 
than other existing schemes, our LRSE scheme is even more 
lightweight because of dimension reduction. Fig.2(b) shows the 
time cost of building index with different document number when 
the vector dimension in LRSE is 300, while the keyword number 
in the dictionary is 4,000 in all the schemes, we can see the time 
cost of LRSE scheme is much less. The time cost of building the 
whole index is almost linear with the size of dataset since the time 
cost of building each subindex is fixed. Fig.2(b) shows time cost 
of building index with different document number, the keywords 
number in the dictionary is 4,000, and we specify vector 
dimension  in LRSE as 400. We can observe that the time cost is 
almost linear with the document number. Besides, in Fig.3 we 
compare the storage overhead of subindex in LRSE, MRSE_I, 
PPSE, etc. within different sizes of vector dimension. The size of 
subindex is absolutely linear with the size of vector dimension. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2: (a) Time cost of building index with different vector 
dimension using 1,000 documents; (b) Time cost of building 
index with different document number. 
 
Figure 3: Size of subindex/trapdoor. 
2) Generating Trapdoor: time cost of generating each trapdoor 
is determined by four parts: search over word embeddings for 
each keyword in the query using HashMap, generate the initial 
vector using mentioned equations in section 4.3, the complexity of 
the splitting process and multiplications of a matrix and two spilt 
query vector. As shown in Fig.4(a), the time of generating a 
trapdoor is greatly affected by the dimension of vectors, and the 
trapdoor generating time of LRSE is much less than other 
schemes due to the difference of their vector dimensions. Besides, 
as illustrated in Fig.4(b), the number of keywords in the query has 
little influence upon the results because the dimension of vector 
and matrices is always fixed, here the vector dimension in LRSE 
is set to 400 by the dimension reduction of LRSE, while the 
keyword number in the dictionary of all the schemes is set to 
4,000. With respect to the size of the trapdoor, it occupies the 
same space overhead as that of each subindex listed in Fig.3, 
which is only determined by the vector dimensions. 
3) Executing Query: the major computation to execute a query 
in the cloud server consists of computing the similarity scores of 
each subindex and trapdoor, ranking similarity scores for all 
documents in the dataset and selecting top-k results from all the 
scored documents. From Fig.5, we can observe that the query 
time of LRSE is much less than other schemes due to the 
difference of vector dimensions. We choose 1,000 documents and 
set k to 50 in our experiment. We can learn that the query time is 
almost linear with the vector dimension. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4: (a) Time cost of generating trapdoor with different 
vector dimension; (b) Time cost of generating trapdoor with 
different keyword number in query. 
 
Figure 5: Time cost of query with 1000 documents. 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we propose a novel Lightweight Efficient Multi-
keyword Ranked Search over Encrypted Cloud Data combining 
SVD and TF×IDF weighting word embeddings, which supports 
top-k retrieval in a harsh adversary model. For the first time, we 
introduce machine learning based method into SE framework, 
which provides search results with higher search quality. Besides, 
system cost experiments on a real-world dataset show LRSE is 
much more lightweight than existing SE schemes. We show 
examples that our scheme can partly support fuzzy and intelligent 
search. Security analysis shows that the proposed scheme accords 
with our formulated privacy requirements. In the future, we will 
conduct experiments on several more common datasets to verify 
the generality of search quality results. 
REFERENCES 
[1] H. Li, Y. Dai, L. Tian, and H. Yang, “Identity-based authentication for cloud 
computing,” in Proceedings of Cloud computing. Springer, 2009, pp. 157–166. 
[2] H. Liang, L. X. Cai, D. Huang, X. Shen, and D. Peng, “A smdpbased service model 
for interdomain resource allocation in mobile cloud networks,” IEEE Transactions on 
Vehicular Technology, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 2222–2232, 2012. 
[3] C. Wang, N. Cao, J. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Secure ranked keyword search over 
encrypted cloud data,” in the 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing 
Systems (ICDCS). IEEE, 2010, pp. 253–262. 
[4] Mikolov, Tomas, et al. "Distributed representations of words and phrases and their 
compositionality." Advances in neural information processing systems. 2013. 
[5] J. Li, Q. Wang, C. Wang, N. Cao, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Fuzzy keyword search over 
encrypted data in cloud computing,” in Proceedings of INFOCOM. IEEE, 2010, pp. 
1–5. 
[6] N. Cao, C. Wang, M. Li, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Privacy-preserving multi-keyword 
ranked search over encrypted cloud data,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and 
Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 222–233, 2014. 
[7] Ishai Y, Kushilevitz E, Ostrovsky R, et al. Cryptography from Anonymity.[J]. 
Foundations of Computer Science Annual Symposium on, 2006, 2006:239-248. 
[8] Shen Z, Shu J, Xue W. Preferred keyword search over encrypted data in cloud 
computing[C]. International Symposium on Quality of Service. ACM, 2013:1-6.     
[9] Zhao R, Li H, Yang Y, et al. Privacy-preserving personalized search over encrypted 
cloud data supporting multi-keyword ranking[C]. Sixth International Conference on 
Wireless Communications and Signal Processing. IEEE, 2014:1-6.     
[10] Nalisnick, Eric, et al. "Improving document ranking with dual word embeddings." 
Proceedings of the 25th International Conference Companion on World Wide Web. 
International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2016.     
[11] J. Yu, P. Lu, Y. Zhu, G. Xue, and M. Li, “Towards secure multi-keyword top-k 
retrieval over encrypted cloud data,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure 
Computing, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 239–250, 2013.     
[12] N. Ferguson, R. Schroeppel, and D. Whiting, “A simple algebraic representation of 
Rijndael,” in Selected Areas in Cryptography. Springer, 2001, pp. 103–111.     
[13] W. K. Wong, D. W.-l. Cheung, B. Kao, and N. Mamoulis, “Secure knn computation 
on encrypted databases,” in the 2009 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on 
Management of data. ACM, 2009, pp. 139–152.     
[14] Xia, Zhihua, et al. "A secure and dynamic multi-keyword ranked search scheme over 
encrypted cloud data." IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems 27.2 
(2016): 340-352.     
[15] Li, Hongwei, et al. "Enabling fine-grained multi-keyword search supporting classified 
sub-dictionaries over encrypted cloud data." IEEE Transactions on Dependable and 
Secure Computing 13.3 (2016): 312-325.     
[16] Alderman, James, Keith M. Martin, and Sarah Louise Renwick. Multi-level Access in 
Searchable Symmetric Encryption. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 
2017/211, 2017.     
[17] Li, Zhen, et al. "Multi-user searchable encryption with a designated server." Annals of 
Tele-communications (2017): 1-13.     
[18] Mitra, Bhaskar, Fernando Diaz, and Nick Craswell. "Learning to Match Using Local 
and Distributed Representations of Text for Web Search.” Proceedings of the 25th 
International Conference Companion on World Wide Web. International World Wide 
Web (WWW) Conferences Steering Committee, 2017.     
[19] Deerwester, S., Dumais, S. T., Furnas, G. W., Landauer, T. K., & Harshman, R. 
(1990). Indexing by latent semantic analysis. Journal of the American society for 
information science, 41(6), 391.     
[20] Evangelopoulos, Nicholas E. "Latent semantic analysis." Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews:   Cognitive Science 4.6 (2013): 683-692. a.     
[21] O'Grady, John G., et al. "Controlled trials of charcoal hemoperfusion and prognostic 
factors in fulminant hepatic failure." Gastroenterology 94.5 (1988): 1186-1192.     
[22] Rivest, Ronald L., Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. "A method for obtaining 
digital sig-natures and public-key cryptosystems." Communications of the ACM21.2 
(1978): 120-126.     
[23] Sun, Wenhai, et al. "Verifiable privacy-preserving multi-keyword text search in the 
cloud supporting similarity-based ranking." IEEE Transactions on Parallel and 
Distributed Systems 25.11 (2014): 3025-3035.     
[24] Krizhevsky, Alex, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E. Hinton. "Imagenet classification 
with deep convolutional neural networks." Advances in neural information processing 
systems. 2012.     
 
